This topic warrants an interim summary.
Early this year, we
posted about how an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) about conflict of interest in health care provoked considerable discussion (see
NY Times editorial, and
USA Today editorial). (
Brennan TA et al. Health industry practices that create conflicts of interest: a policy proposal for academic medical centers. JAMA 2006; 295: 429-433.) The article posited conflicts of interest as a major threat to physicians' core values. Its exclusive focus was on conflicts of interest involving physicians and pharmaceutical and device manufacturers. It proposed a ban on many possible relationships between physicians and these companies. It asserted that even small gifts, such as pens and coffee mugs with company logos, could influence physicians' decision making. Therefore, it proposed an absolute ban on any gifts of any type to physicians. It also proposed absolute bans on physician service on company speaker bureaus and participation in ghose-written articles. It proposed that all financing of academic activities by pharmaceutical and device companies go through appropriate offices at academic medical centers.
Only a few days later we stumbled across a case of a species of conflict of interest that seemed to be more significant than those discussed in this article, yet had never been discussed in the press or the medical literature (see post
here). The case was that of the Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its acadmic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as
a member of the board of directors of
Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the
board of directors of
Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.
Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.
So, to return to our first example, leaders of the UCSD Medical School must decide whether to purchase medical devices from Boston Scientific or its competitors, perhaps whether to do research concerning such devices, and perhaps whether to cooperate or compete with research done by contract research organizations such as Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc. Yet they also must report to a leader who has a fiduciary duty to and is paid by Boston Scientific and Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc.
Thus alerted, I kept my eye out for other examples of this sort of conflict. To my surprise, they were easy to find.
For example, Dr Ralph Horowitz, Dean of the Medical School at Case-Western Reserve University,
was recently appointed to the board of UK based
GlaxoSmithKline, although his appointment was then rescinded after the company found he had written an article criticizing one of its products (see post
here).
Also, Donna Shalala is President of the University of Miami, and hence the person to whom the University of Miami Leonard M. Miller School of Medicine and its academic medical center reports. President Shalala is
on the board of directors of
UnitedHealth Group, a large, for-profit managed care organization and health insurer.
I also found a sub-species of this conflict: influential academic leaders of health care research and health policy research who serve on the boards of directors of health care companies whose interests are relevant to their research. This is in some ways similar to the more widely discussed conflicts that may be generated when an academic consults for, serves on a speakers bureau for, owns stock in, or receives research funding from a health care corporation. However, again, service on a board, while it is often well paid, also entails a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the company and its stockholders. Three examples of this sub-species appeared this month.
Professor Joseph Newhouse of Harvard University was the senior author of
an article in Health Affairs about whether oncologists decide which chemotherapy drugs to used based on how they are reimbursed for these drugs. Professor Newhouse, a health care researcher with an international reputation,
serves on the board of directors for
Aetna Inc., a large for-profit managed care organization and health insurance company. Although some of his previous articles have disclosed this relationship, this one did not. (See post
here.)
Mary O'Neill Mundinger, Dean of the School of Nursing of Columbia University, wrote a book chapter in a new
book on primary care advocating advanced practice nurses as comparable or even superior to physicians. Dean Mundinger
serves on the board of directors of
UnitedHealth Group. The book chapter, and some of her previous articles advocating advanced practice nursing did not disclose this relationship. (See post
here.)
Professor Uwe Reinhardt, an internationally known health economist at Princeton University, wrote a letter which
challenged an op-ed in the New York Times which had decried the effect of business management practices, and of managed care on the doctor-patient relationship. Professor Reinhardt is also on the
board of directors of
Boston Scientific, on
the board of directors of
Triad Hospitals, a for-profit hospital network, and on the
board of directors of
Amerigroup, a for-profit managed care organization. His letter, and his recent articles in JAMA, Health Affairs, and the British Medical Journal did not reveal these relationships. (See post here.)
The ease with which I found examples of conflicts of interest generated by service on a health care company's board of directors suggests that these conflicts may be quite common. Because such service entails a fiduciary duty to protect the company's interests and those of its stock-holders, such conflicts may be quite important. Yet I have found no discussion of this sort of conflict in the media, or in the health care or medical literature. It makes no sense that such conflicts have been ignored while we worry about physicians receiving pens and coffee mugs with company logos. We ought to start paying some attention.
Post Title → A New Species of Conflict of Interest in Health Care