Former NIH Director Spins Through Revolving Door, Ends Up at Sanofi-Aventis

A bit of news that got little attention this month was a new job for the former head of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Dr Elias Zerhouni had left the NIH in October, 2008.  Here is the Reuters version of the story of his hew career:

French drugmaker Sanofi-Aventis (SASY.PA) replaced its head of research and development with a leading academic and former top U.S. health official on Tuesday to raise its game in medical innovations.

The company said Elias Zerhouni would lead R&D of drugs and bring R&D for vaccines under his control too as Sanofi reshapes its portfolio and looks to vaccines as one area for growth to offset sales losses from mounting generic competition.

The appointment of Zerhouni, a professor of radiology and biomedical engineering, comes as Sanofi battles to buy U.S. rare disease specialist Genzyme.

Chief executive Chris Viehbacher brought in Zerhouni in February 2009 as his scientific adviser, shortly after taking charge of the group which he has been transforming to include the development of drugs based on biotechnology.

Zerhouni's Embrace of Corporate Health Care

Although Zerhouni ostensibly left the NIH to return to academia at Johns Hopkins University, note that by February, 2009, four months after his resignation was announced, Zerhouni was already advising the Sanofi CEO. 

Soon after he joined the corporate health care world in earnest.  In April, 2009, he was proposed for membership on the board of directors of Actelion Ltd, a Swiss biotechnology company.  On December 8, 2009, he was elected to the board of Danaher Corp, a diversified technology corporation which makes medical devices.  At some time he had become President of the Zerhouni Group, which advertised itself as a resource to "pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, trade organizations, sovereign wealth funds, government agencies, and research entities around the globe."

Zerhouni at the NIH: His Response to the Conflict of Interest Scandal

There is more than a little irony inspired by Zerhouni's quick circuit through the revolving door.

Zerhouni became director of the NIH in 2002, and announced his departure in October, 2008. In December, 2003, David Willman published his landmark article in the Los Angeles Times on severe conflicts of interest affecting NIH scientists and leaders.  It revealed that formerly stringent conflict of interest policies at the Institutes were rescinded by then director Dr Harold Varmus in 1995, during the Clinton administration, and increasingly since 1998, disclosure of NIH personnel's conflicts of interest had been reduced.  Thus, in 2002, Zerhouni had taken charge of an agency already deeply affected by conflicts of interest affecting many of its leaders, even though that was not yet public.  He initially did nothing about the situation. 

Willman published another series of articles revealing even more breathtaking conflicts of interest in December, 2004.  (See our post here.)   By then, a Los Angeles Times editorial said there was the "appearance of corruption" at the NIH, and called for Dr Zerhouni's resignation. 

Only after the second series of articles did Dr Zerhouni swing into action (see post here).  In February, 2005, he announced that he would now hold the NIH to a "higher standard."  Yet new conflict of interest stories kept surfacing and their handling kept provoking concern (e.g., see this post from 2007, and this post from 2008), and concerns about how NIH deals with conflicts of interest affecting the extramural researchers it funds persist to this day (e.g., see this post). 

By the late 1990s, the NIH, like many other government agencies, seemed to have become extremely cozy with the world of big corporations.  Dr Zerhouni did nothing to obvious to reduce the local version of this coziness until it had become a public scandal.  His actions let questions about the relationships of the NIH, once a pristine example of a government run biomedical research agency, with big health care business persist to this day. 

So it should perhaps be no surprise that he so quickly transitioned from the government that is supposed to be"of the people, by the people, for the people" to top leadership positions in corporate health care.

Other US Government Health Care Agency Leaders Transit the Revolving Door

Meanwhile, the previous commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration, Dr Andrew von Eschenbach, is Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at the Center for Health Transformation, a group whose membership includes some of the biggest health care organizations, many of which have had their own moments in the sun on Health Care Renewal.  For example, see Charter Members, AstraZeneca, Sutter Health, and Wellpoint; and Platinum Members, GlaxoSmithKline and Merck.  Dr Eschenbach is also on the board of directors of Histosonics Inc. 

Also, the previous director of the Centers for Disease Control, Dr Julie Geberding, became President of Merck Vaccines in late 2009. 

Conclusions

So the revolving door just keeps spinning, its revolutions suggesting how closely tied together big government and big corporations have become in what is now the health care business.  Whatever the motivations of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were, the message to every person in a leadership position in health care in the US government has to still be: you too can earn big corporate compensation soon after you leave here.  Who knows how much that siren song will lead current government leaders to avoid antagonizing the leaders of big health care corporations during their government "service."  That is, of course, not what we want them to be thinking about if government agencies ae to serve the people, not the CEOs of big corporations. 

I am sure that the career transitions of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were perfectly legal.  If we want government health care agencies to put the peoples' interests ahead of those of the CEOs of big health care corporations, should not, however, the law be changed to at least slow down the revolving door?

Post Title → Former NIH Director Spins Through Revolving Door, Ends Up at Sanofi-Aventis

Who Investigated the Case of the Deadly Contaminated Heparin?

A year and a half ago, we posted quite a bit about the case of the deadly contaminated heparin. In retrospect, what is most amazing is how quickly this case fell off the radar screen.

Summary of the Case of the Deadly Contaminated Heparin

Here is a summary:

- We have posted several times, recently here and here, about the tragic case of suddenly allergenic heparin. Although heparin, an intravenous biologic anti-coagulant, has been in use for over 70 years, serious allergic reactions to it had heretofore been rare. Starting late last year, hundreds of such reactions, and now 21 deaths were reported in the US after intravenous heparin infusions.All the heparin related to these events in the US was made by Baxter International.
- We then learned that although the heparin carried the Baxter label, it was not really made by Baxter. The company had outsourced production of the active ingredient to a long, and ultimately mysterious supply chain. Baxter got the active ingredient from a US company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. Changzhou SPL, in turn, got it from several consolidators or wholesalers, who in turn got it from numerous small, unidentified "workshops," which seemed to produce the product in often primitive and unsanitary conditions. None of the stops in the Chinese supply chain had apparently been inspected by the US Food and Drug Administration nor its Chinese counterpart.
- Most recently, we found out that the Baxter International labelled heparin was contaminated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate, a substance not found in nature, but which mimics heparin according to the simple laboratory tests used in the Chinese facilities to check incoming heparin. (See post here.) Further testing revealed that the contamination seemed to have taken place in China prior to the provision of the heparin to Changzhou SPL. (See post here.) It is not clear whether Baxter International or Scientific Protein Laboratories had inspected most of the steps in the supply chain, or even knew what went on there.
- The Baxter and Scientific Protein Laboratories CEOs did not seem aware of where they got the heparin on which the Baxter International label was eventually affixed. But one report in the New York Times alleged that Scientific Protein Laboratories would not pay enough for heparin to satisfy any sources other than the small "workshops."
- Leaders of all organizations involved, Baxter International, Scientific Protein Laboratories, Changzhou SPL, the Chinese government, and the US Food and Drug Administration, and the US Congress assigned blame to each other, but none took individual or organizational responsibility. (See post here.)

Since we last posted about the case, three prominent articles by one research group appeared that addressed how contamination of the heparin with oversulfated chondroitin sulfate lead to adverse reactions, some fatal (1-3). An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine congratulated all the scientists on quickly figuring out the nature of the problem, "allowing heparin to come clean," but did not comment on what the case might mean for drug regulation, or the leadership of health care organizations.(4) The case was used to illustrate the difficulties of national regulation of an increasingly out-sourced pharmaceutical industry.(5) Dr Jerry Avorn did call for more effective, better funded and up to date pharmaceutical regulation.(6)

At the time, I thought that the most striking feature of this case, beyond the deaths of many real patients, was how every leader involved tried to dodge accountability for it. Now, in August, 2009, I have been unable to discover whether any of them subsequently took accountability for it. And in this post global financial collapse world, I would now add that the case also exemplifies the adverse effects of the single-minded pursuit of short-term profit and economic efficiency.

However, in retrospect, the most distressing aspect of this case is its lack of repercussions, specifically, the lack of any inquiry into how the oversulfated chondroitin sulfate got into the supposedly pure heparin given to patients, and how such adulteration of pharmaceuticals could be prevented in the future.

Allegations of Conflicts of Interest Affecting the Scientific Investigation of the Case

This week, however, the case has an eerie echo. The Wall Street Journal just reported allegations that the US FDA official involved in the case has conflicts of interest.

The investigation of Janet Woodcock, the director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, stems from an ethics complaint filed by Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., a California company that says it has been delayed in its six-year effort to win approval for a generic version of Lovenox, a multi-billion-dollar blood thinner.

In its complaint, Amphastar alleges that its competitor had special access to Dr. Woodcock at critical times in the prolonged approval process, which is ongoing. Amphastar points out that Dr. Woodcock co-authored a scientific paper with scientists at Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc. while both companies were battling to win FDA approval of their generic blood thinners.

Amphastar contends that Dr. Woodcock's collaboration with Momenta is a conflict of interest and has asked that she recuse herself from the entire matter at the FDA.

Both Amphastar and Momenta, which is based in Cambridge, Mass., submitted applications seeking FDA approval of their generic versions of Lovenox heparin sold by Sanofi-Aventis SA. Amphastar applied in 2003, two years before Momenta.

Lovenox, a low-molecular-weight heparin, is a blockbuster biologic drug that brought in $3.5 billion in world-wide sales last year.

The specific allegations were:

Amphastar, in letters sent to the FDA in April and June, cited some public contacts and email between Dr. Woodcock and one of Momenta's founders, Massachusetts Institute of Technology biological engineering professor Ram Sasisekharan, beginning in February 2007. Among those contacts were their attendance at an international medical conference in Thailand in November 2007.

Mainly, however, Amphastar points to Dr. Sasisekharan's appointment to lead an FDA task force in early 2008, which put him and Momenta in regular contact with the agency. That task force was investigating tainted Chinese-made heparin, a crisis that led to nearly 100 deaths.

Drs. Woodcock and Sasisekharan, along with other Momenta scientists, then co-authored two medical journal articles last year identifying the cause of the contaminated Chinese heparin imports, a finding that won scientific -- as well as Wall Street -- kudos for Momenta.

It is unusual for FDA officials to co-author journal articles with industry researchers....

In April 2008, after the tainted-heparin article was published, an investment report from Morgan Stanley cited Momenta's FDA connection as a 'game-changer,' and Momenta's stock jumped 17% in a day.

So, Dr Woodstock arranged for the scientific investigation of the contaminated heparin to be carried out mainly by people employed by or with financial relationships with Momenta Pharmaceuticals. The (actually three) articles published as a result of this investigation (1-3), disclosed most of these relationships, but seemed to minimize the relationship of the senior author of all three articles, Dr Ram Sasiskekharan, to the company. Although he was actually a co-founder of the company, and has been on the board of directors of the company since 2001,
none of the articles mentioned the former relationship, and only one specifically mentioned the latter. Although the two New England Journal of Medicine articles referred to Momenta Pharmaceuticals' abilities to analyze "complex mixtures, including heparin," none mentioned that the company is developing two anticoagulant products, M-enoxaparin and M118, which could compete with heparin (as described in the company's investor relationships web-page).

On the other hand, the Nature Biotech article(3) noted that Dr Sasiskekharan and one other author have "served as scientific advisors to Scientific Protein Laboratories," and a third author was a scientific advisor to Baxter International. The relationship between Dr Sasiskekharan and SPL was noted by two of the New England Journal articles(1-2).

Questions Raised

So the complaint about Dr Woodcock by Amphastar raises multiple questions about the investigation of the case of the deadly contaminated heparin.

• Why did the FDA put the scientific investigation of Baxter International/ Scientific Protein Laboratories / Changzhou SPL contaminated heparin in the hands of multiple employees, and the co-founder and board member of Momenta Pharmaceuticals, a company that applied to market a product to compete with heparin?
• Was the nature of this apparent conflict clear to the federal agencies that also funded the investigation, which included the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)?
• Did the federal agencies involved also realize that several of the investigators, including the apparent senior investigator, also had ties to two companies (Baxter International and Scientific Protein Laboratories) involved in the production of the contaminated heparin?
• If the federal agencies did not know of the conflicts, why not? And what will they do about them now?
• If the federal agencies did know of all the conflicts, why did they allow such a conflicted group of scientists to investigate one of the most important cases of drug adulteration of the new century?

Although there has now been a scientific investigation into the nature of the contamination of the deadly heparin, there has not been any formal inquiry of which I am aware into the actions, decisions and events that allowed the case to unfold. Now that the case seems to involve not only questionable business management decisions, but also a conflicted scientific investigation, maybe someone in authority will see to it that such an investigation occurs.

Finally, the case of the deadly contaminated heparin now becomes another illustration of how the complex web of conflicts of interest that pervades our health care system may muddle efforts to protect the public from adulterated medicines, one of the more fundamental public health responsibilities of the government.

Hat tip to and see further comments by Prof Margaret Soltan in the University Diaries blog.

References

1. Kishimoto TK, Viswanathan K, Ganguly T, Elankumaran S, Smith S, Pelzer K et al. Contaminated heparin associated with adverse clinical events and activation of the contact system. N Engl J Med 2008; 358: 2457-67. [Link here.]
2. Blossom DB, Kallen AJ, Patel PR, Elward A, Robinson L, Gao G et al. Outbreak of adverse reactions associated with contaminated heparin. N Engl J Med 2008; 359: 2674-84. [Link here.]
3. Guerrini M, Becaati D, Shriver Z, Naggi A, Viswanathan K, Bisio A et al. Oversulfated chondroitin sulfate is a contaminant in heparin associated with adverse clinical events. Nature Biotech 2008; 26: 669-675. [Link here.]
4. Schwartz LB. Heparin comes clean. N Engl J Med 2008; 358: 2505-9. [Link here.]
5. Schweitzer SO. Trying times at the FDA - the challenge of ensuring the safety of imported pharmaceuticals. N Engl J Med 2008; 358: 1773-7. [Link here.]
6. Avorn J. Coagulation and adulteration - building on science and policy lessons from 1905. N Engl J Med 2008; 358: 2429-31. [Link here.]

Post Title → Who Investigated the Case of the Deadly Contaminated Heparin?

Funny Sorts of Ombudsmen at the CDC

We have previously posted (most recently here) about allegations of mismanagement at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The Atlanta Journal Constitution just reported an unusual exchange between Dr Julie Geberding, the head of the CDC, and US Senator Charles Grassley, the senior Republican on the US Senate Finance Committee. It seems that Senator Grassley requested a briefing from the newly hired CDC ombudsmen, but Dr Geberding refused the request.

In a March 5 letter to Grassley, Geberding said the two contract employees the CDC has hired to serve as interim ombudsmen believe that briefing the senator would violate standards of practice for ombudsmen and render them unable to continue to do their jobs effectively.

'While I am respectful of your desire to get further information, I am also sensitive to these principles — especially because CDC's Ombudsman Office is in a critical stage of development,' Gerberding wrote.

The big problem with that argument is that the ombudsmen already had agreed to brief Geberding.

Grassley's letter questions the validity of the ombudsmen's reasoning, stating that he is neither the subject of the ombudsmen's inquiries 'nor a potential cause of employee angst at CDC.' He notes that the ombudsmen have met and briefed Gerberding. Many employees blame Gerberding and her leadership for problems at the agency.

'Dr. Gerberding, am I missing something here?' Grassley asked in his letter. 'Why would two individuals claim preserving their objectivity as Ombudsmen requires refusing to brief Congress, but allows meeting with you to discuss their findings?' Grassley wrote, adding that he's not surprised that few CDC employees have 'felt comfortable approaching these two men to seek their help on their problems with CDC management.'

In my humble opinion, it's a funny sort of ombudsman who reports to the leader of his or her government agency, but cannot report to Congressional oversight. I would imagine any half-way rational CDC employee would be very hesitant to say anything to the ombudsmen that might be the slightest bit offensive to the leadership of the CDC.

Thus, the CDC still appears to be an agency whose leadership does not easily tolerate criticism. Given the scientific basis of the agency, this would appear to be yet another example of mission-hostile management, US government agency style.

But it seems that in many kinds of health care organizations, not just in the US, not just government agencies, the worst sin is to criticize the management. Given the ineptness, and worse of the management of many health care organizations (some of which has been featured on Health Care Renewal), is it any wonder that health care is in a mess?

Post Title → Funny Sorts of Ombudsmen at the CDC