Some Call it "Tyranny" - Top Leaders of University of California (Including Leaders of Academic Medicine) Demand Bigger Pensions for Themselves

The state of California, and its flagship university system, the University of California, have been under extreme financial pressure lately. 

The 36 Executives' Demands

However, that apparently has not decreased the University's hired managers' and executives' sense of entitlement.  They are threatening to sue if their pensions are not increased.  As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle,

Three dozen of the University of California's highest-paid executives are threatening to sue unless UC agrees to spend tens of millions of dollars to dramatically increase retirement benefits for employees earning more than $245,000.

'We believe it is the University's legal, moral and ethical obligation' to increase the benefits, the executives wrote the Board of Regents in a Dec. 9 letter and position paper obtained by The Chronicle.

'Failure to do so will likely result in a costly and unsuccessful legal confrontation,' they wrote, using capital letters to emphasize that they were writing 'URGENTLY.'

Their demand comes as UC is trying to eliminate a vast, $21.6 billion unfunded pension obligation by reducing benefits for future employees, raising the retirement age, requiring employees to pay more into UC's pension fund and boosting tuition.

The fatter executive retirement benefits the employees are seeking would add $5.5 million a year to the pension liability, UC has estimated, plus $51 million more to make the changes retroactive to 2007, as the executives are demanding.

The executives fashioned their demand as a direct challenge to UC President Mark Yudof, who opposes the increase.

'Forcing resolution in the courts will put 200 of the University's most senior, most visible current and former executives and faculty leaders in public contention with the President and the Board,' they wrote.

Background to the Case
Here is the relevant background:

The roots of the pension dispute go back to 1999, five years after the IRS limited how much compensation could be included in retirement package calculations. But even after the IRS granted UC's waiver in 2007, nothing changed.

University executives were having troubles of their own that year.

President Robert Dynes resigned in 2007 after it was discovered that UC was awarding secret bonuses, perks and extra pay to executives. State auditors also found that UC's compensation practices were riddled with errors and policy violations.

UC officials also had become aware of another big problem: UC's pension obligations were about to outstrip its ability to pay retirees. Neither UC nor its employees had paid into the fund since 1990.

It took until this year for UC to act. In September, a retirement task force offered Yudof several options for closing the $21.6 billion gap - and one to widen it: increasing executive pensions.

Health Care Executives Included

Note that in addition to a bunch of finance officers and portfolio and asset managers, the demanding executives included quite a few leaders of the medical schools, and academic medical centers, including:

UC System's Central Office
Dr. Jack Stobo, senior vice president, health services and affairs

UCSF
Dr. Sam Hawgood, vice chancellor and dean, School of Medicine
Ken Jones, chief operating officer, medical center
Mark Laret, CEO, medical center
Larry Lotenero chief information officer, medical center
John Plotts, senior vice chancellor

UC Davis
William McGowan, CFO, health system
Dr. Claire Pomeroy, CEO health system, vice chancellor/dean, School of Medicine
Ann Madden Rice, CEO Medical Center

UCLA
Dr. David Feinberg, CEO of the hospital system; associate vice chancellor
Dr. Gerald Levey, dean emeritus
Virginia McFerran, chief information officer of the health system
Amir Dan Rubin, chief operating officer of the hospital system
Dr. J. Thomas Rosenthal, chief medical officer of the hospital system; associate vice chancellor
Paul Staton, chief financial officer of the hospital system

UC San Diego
Dr. David Brenner, vice chancellor for health sciences; dean of the School of Medicine
Tom Jackiewicz, CEO, associate vice chancellor of the health system
Dr. Thomas McAfee, dean for clinical affairs

UC Irvine
Terry Belmont, CEO, Medical Center

The Outraged Reaction
The executives' demands sparked anger on campus.

Dissenting members of the task force said it would be unseemly' to expand executive pensions. Tuition had just been increased by 32 percent this fall, and the regents were poised to raise it another 8 percent for fall 2011. They also voted to shift more money into the retirement fund from employees' pockets, as low-wage workers worried about retiring into poverty.

'I think it's pretty outrageous that this group of highly compensated administrators of a public university are challenging the president and the chair of the Board of Regents, said Daniel Simmons, chairman of UC's Academic Senate and a law professor at UC Davis.

'What outrages me the most is that these 36 people are blind to the fact that this is a public entity in dire straits,' said Simmons, who also served on the retirement task force and opposed the higher pensions.

The demands prompted outrage from politicians and editorialists. A few choice samples:

- The executives are "tarnishing the university's name with greed," editorial (UCLA) Daily Bruin.

- "Very out of touch," by Governor Elect Jerry Brown; "truly living in an ivory tower...." while "people are suffering in the rest of the state and losing their homes," by Assemblyman Jerry Hill, D- San Mateo (per the San Francisco Chronicle)

- "Uncaring and divisive," "undercuts public support for one of California's most treasured institutions," "sending out its own special-interest message: what's in it for me," - editorial, San Francisco Chronicle.

- "despicable threat," the California Regents (UC board of trustees) should not "claim that lavish pension may be needed to recruit good people to UC. Good people don't threaten lawsuits against a cash-strapped sate to enrich themselves." editorial, Sacramento Bee.

- Governor-Elect B4rown should issue an executive order "to eliminate any position in the University of California system paying $245,000 a year or more," (thus effectively firing all the 36 complaining executives); "free taxpayers and students alike from the tyranny of those whose main objective during any time - tough or otherwise - is to keep milking the state for every penny the can squeeze out," editorial, Manteca Bulletin.

Summary

We have posted frequently about hired managers and executives of health care organizations receiving compensation and benefits out of all proportion to their apparent performance. The case of the demanding University of California executives is just one of many. However, what is really remarkable about this case is the reaction to it. We are hearing top leaders, including many of the top leaders of the state's medical schools and academic medical centers, called uncaring, greedy, and despicable by well-known politicians and in newspaper editorials, and we are hearing calls that they be fired, en masse.

Maybe we are at a tipping point.

Of course, hired health care managers and executives are not entitled to line their own pockets while patients and their other constituencies suffer during the great recession. They are not entitled to continually drive health care costs up while they enrich themselves.

However, apathy, learned helplessness, and the anechoic effect have let them promote themselves into a de facto new aristocracy (just like the hired managers and executives of some other non-profit organizations, for-profit corporations, and especially financial service corporations have turned themselves into the rest of that aristocracy.)

If we do not reclaim health care from these new oligarchs, we will all end up not just with expensive, difficult to access, mediocre health care, but under their tyranny.

Post-Script

This is just the latest example of the sense of entitlement displayed by the hired managers and executives of the University of California. Outrageous pay and benefits unjustified by any measure of performance for University of California's hired managers and executives has been grist for the Health Care Renewal mill since 2005.  A few samples:
-  The ranks of those paid more than $200 K rose much faster than those paid less, while lower paid employees endured a pay freeze, and the university cut its budget.  Managers got bonuses for extra work, while faculty did not.  Managers got housing allowances, and other perks.  (November, 2005) 
- UC-Irvine managers were paid lavishly while presiding over debacles involving transplant services  (liver transplants, November, 2005; bone marrow transplants, January, 2006; kidney transplants, January, 2006)
- UC - San Diego Chancellor was paid $359 K plus a bonus of $248 K for supposed full time work while serving on ten for-profit corporate and non-profit boards, including directorships of for-profit health care corporations that were conflicts of interest with her role overseeing the medical school and medical center.  This was the first case of what we later called the "new species of conflicts of interest" posted on the blog.  (January, 2006)
- UC - Irvine managers got bonuses while its medical center failed an inspection (January, 2010), as did managers at other UC campuses (January, 2010).

Maybe if these older stories produced more outraged, the current situation would not have occurred.

You heard it first on Health Care Renewal

Hat tip to Prof Margaret Soltan on the University Diaries blog.

Post Title → Some Call it "Tyranny" - Top Leaders of University of California (Including Leaders of Academic Medicine) Demand Bigger Pensions for Themselves

Did a Yakuza Boss Pay "A Million Dollars for One Liver?"

One of the more bizarre stories to appear on Health Care Renewal just resurfaced.  To summarize, in June, 2008, we posted about the strange case of four Japanese men, allegedly affiliated with Yakuza criminal organizations, who received liver transplants from the UCLA Medical Center, apparently with some alacrity. All likely paid full list prices for their procedures, and two later donated $100,000 each to the medical center. The case raised concerns by several notables (including Senator Charles Grassley, and Professor Arthur Caplan) about the integrity of the transplant system. Presumably these concerns were based on suspicions that the four may have received a higher priority than others on the list. More concerns should have been raised after it was revealed that shadowy characters threatened a reporter who started to investigate the case in Japan, and the reporter's family (see post here).  Later, the Chancellor for Medical Sciences and Dean of the David Geffen School of Medicine's public response to the case side-stepped all the important concerns while deploying a series of logical fallacies (see post here).

Then, despite all the colorful details and ethical concerns presented by this story, it faded from view for a year and a half. 

Last night, the US investigative reporting television show "60 Minutes" aired a follow-up on the Yakuza transplants, following closely on the publication of a book, Tokyo Vice, by Jake Adelstein, the reporter who first broke the story.

The web-based version of the 60 Minutes story reprised the main points, but added emphasis to a few of interest to Health Care Renewal. 

First, the 60 Minutes piece raised suspicions that the Yakuza members paid a premium to jump the UCLA liver transplant priority list:

Getting into the U.S. was one thing, but getting a liver transplant at a leading American medical center like UCLA was something else altogether.

'What's the average waiting time for someone in California waiting for a liver transplant?' [CBS correspondent Lara] Logan asked California attorney Larry Eisenberg.

'It's probably realistically three years. And it could be much longer,' he replied.

Not for Tadamasa Goto, who got a liver in just six weeks. Eisenberg finds that surprising, especially since Goto was number 80 on the waiting list.

'It should not be possible that an unsavory character from out of the country, with ties to organized crime, comes into the United States and gets a priority and obtains a transplant,' Eisenberg said.

Two families, Eisenberg's clients, both lost loved ones waiting for livers at another transplant center in the same area: Salvador Ceja was number two on the waiting list; John Rader was number five.

'Do you think, for one second, that this was legitimate? That they stood in line and waited just like your husband did?' Logan asked Rader's widow Cheryl.

'Absolutely not,' she replied. 'No. Because nobody gets a liver that quickly.'

'I think they were playing God,' Yolanda Carballo, Ceja's stepdaughter, added. 'Now, I think they were picking and choosing who they wanted to give a liver to.'

'So, in your minds, what was this about?' Logan asked.

'Money,' Rader said. 'Spoke loud and clear. And they listened.'

'That's what it was all about. Money,' Carballo agreed.

Three of Goto's Yakuza cronies also got liver transplants at UCLA. For them, money was no object. UCLA says each of their transplants cost about $400,000 dollars; the Yakuza all paid cash.


The hospital also acknowledged Goto and another Yakuza each made $100,000 donations to the transplant center.


Adelstein says Goto paid even more. 'According to police documents and sources, a million dollars for Goto. A million dollars,' he told Logan.

'A million dollars for one liver?' she asked.

'A million dollars for one liver,' Adelstein said.

Second, 60 Minutes emphasized the risk Mr Adelstein faced after he drew attention to the story of the Yakuza liver transplants at UCLA:

Tadamasa Goto returned to his life of crime as a Yakuza godfather and it all stayed hidden until Adelstein was tipped off. It took him years to piece together the details for a newspaper story. Then, when word got out that Adelstein knew, the Yakuza tried to buy his silence, offering him half a million dollars.

Asked if he was tempted by the cash offer, Adelstein said, 'Of course I'm tempted. You know? When someone offers you half a million dollars not to write something, but then again, you know I don't want to be owned by organized crime the rest of my life.'

Adelstein wrote the story for 'The Washington Post' and it eventually made its way back to Japan. The news infuriated the Yakuza bosses. For Goto, it was a humiliating blow from which he would never recover.

'I heard from someone very close to him that as he was leaving and getting in his car he said, 'That goddamn American Jew reporter, I wanna kill him,'' Adelstein said.

Japanese and U.S. law enforcement agents took Goto's threat seriously.

Adelstein now lives alone, under Tokyo police protection; his wife and children are in hiding.

'Are you concerned that there is an American citizen here whose life is at risk?' Logan asked the U.S. Embassy's Mike Cox.

'Very much so. I mean, we think the Japanese police are doing what they can to make sure that no harm comes to Mr. Adelstein. I mean, we certainly don't want to see anything happen to him,' Cox said.

'What do you have to do in your daily life to stay alive?' Logan asked Adelstein.

'You have to keep your rooms shuttered, because you don't want a sniper to pick you off across from somebody’s house,' he said.

Asked if he lives in darkness, Adelstein said, 'When I'm up in my room typing, yes. All the rooms are shuttered. You gotta be very careful on rainy days. Because when Yakuza take people out, they like to do it on rainy days, because fewer people are on the streets and the rain washes away trace evidence.'

Even in disgrace, Tadamasa Goto still has a small army of loyal soldiers and a hit out on Jake Adelstein. The Yakuza say he will never be safe.

'When someone does something that causes them (Yakuza) to lose face, they will use any means possible, legal or illegal, to crush the person who has gotten in their way, who has humiliated them,' the disguised Yakuza boss told Logan.

Finally, 60 Minutes found that the UCLA Medical Center continued to be uncooperative, cloaking its refusal to categorically refute allegations that it sold a liver for a million dollars in concerns with patient confidentiality:

Asked if UCLA knew who these people were, Adelstein said, 'When you see guys with lots of tattoos, missing fingers, wouldn't it occur to you, like, 'Oh, this guy is a gangster.' I can't believe they didn't know.'

Attorney Eisenberg says transplant rules require extensive background checks on every patient. Yet, UCLA insisted to federal investigators they had 'no knowledge' that Goto or his cronies had ties to Japanese organized crime.

UCLA declined all of 60 Minutes' requests for interviews. The only thing the medical center will say on the record is that their program has been reviewed and found to be in 'total compliance' with liver transplant rules.

The hospital told us, 'state and federal patient confidentiality laws prohibit UCLA from responding to the…issues raised by 60 Minutes.'

'In my opinion, the medical center has a moral and ethical obligation to determine the source of those funds,' Eisenberg said.

'A moral and ethical obligation, but apparently no legal obligation?' Logan asked.

'Well, it's not addressed in the rules specifically,' Eisenberg said

As I wrote in my first post on this case, you just can't make this stuff up...

However, the colorfulness of the case should not distract from its very serious implications.  We have written a lot in this blog about the anechoic effect, how cases with important implications about ethics, governance and leadership in health care often fail to attract the attention they deserve.  We have opined that academics and professionals have realized that it is simply "not done" to discuss cases which might offend the powerful leaders of health care organizations.  We have written about whistle-blowers who have lost jobs or been theatened with lawsuits.  But in this case, the journalist who wrote about the case allegedly has received death threats and lives in hiding under police protection.  This may be the most serious case of the anechoic effect known.

Furthermore, we have written a lot in this blog about how leaders of health care organizations ought to uphold their organizations' mission and the core values to which physicians and other health care professionals have sworn devotion.  The continued disinclination of UCLA leadership to respond to charges that its medical center accepted $1 million to put Japanese gangsters at the head of the liver transplant list may reflect fear of gangsters who also allegedly threatened the life of the journalist who reported the case.  But by failing to rebut such charges, the leadership leaves the impression that they cannot claim to be better than the moral equivalents of gangsters.  Institutions that aspire to join "the ranks of the nations [sic] elite medical schools" ought also to aspire to have leaders that have better ethics than Yakuza bosses.  

Transparency International has suggested that health care corruption is a global scourge that costs lives.  Serious health care reform cannot ignore health care corruption as a cause of excess costs, denied access, and poor quality.  Health care organizations ought to be held to a higher standard of ethics, and be less prone to corruption than, for example, garbage hauling firms.  Health care organizations ought to subscribe to rigorous codes of ethics, impartially enforced, which apply to all within the organizations, including top leaders.  While the accused need to be afforded due process, whistle-blowers must also be protected.  In my humble opinion, true health care reform requires so confronting health care corruption.  Maybe the leadership of the Gefen School of Medicine might want to consider setting an example in this regard. 

Note: Jake Adelstein's book is available here, and it was reviewed by Reuters here and by the AP (via the Canadian Press) here.

Post Title → Did a Yakuza Boss Pay "A Million Dollars for One Liver?"

Did Mrs. Jones receive her off-label failed spinal implant via excellent informatics data, or via a surgeon's visit to a prostitute?

In a story that leaves me at a loss for what has become of medical ethics, I read that Medtronic stands accused of, among other marketing tactics, inducing surgeons to use its spinal implant devices via kickbacks and outings to a now-closed Memphis strip club whose owners pleaded guilty to dancers engaging in acts of prostitution.

Apparently the devices were being used extensively for off-label uses, resulting in unexpected adverse events, some quite serious in nature.

I could not have made up this rather sordid story if I tried:

Wall Street Journal
Sept. 25, 2008

Lawsuit Says Medtronic Gave Doctors Array of Perks

(subscription required)

A lawsuit brought by a former Medtronic Inc. lawyer alleges the big medical-device maker gave surgeons a variety of incentives to use its products, including regular entertainment at a Memphis strip club, trips to Alaska and patent royalties on inventions they played no part in. The previously undisclosed allegations involve Medtronic's spinal-devices unit, which has $3 billion in annual revenue. The unit's business relationships with doctors who use its spinal-repair implants are being investigated by Sen. Charles Grassley and have been the focus of lawsuits by other former employees.

Sen. Grassley has been looking into whether inducements for doctors, like those alleged in the lawyer's suit, have led to what surgeons say is widespread off-label use of Medtronic spine products.

... Ms Kelley's [whistleblower Ami P. Kelley, a former senior legal counsel for the spine unit] lawsuit says kickbacks were "pervasive" and "the culture and way of doing business" at Medtronic. Sales staff, she said, "routinely took physicians" visiting the spine unit's Memphis headquarters to the Platinum Plus strip club, and picked up the tab for the dancers' services during "VIP visits." In 2007, Platinum Plus's owner pleaded guilty to charges related to dancers engaging in acts of prostitution, and the club has closed.

Ms. Kelley's lawsuit sought to recoup damages for the federal government, which prohibits companies from giving doctors inducements to use products covered by Medicare or Medicaid.

Her lawsuit and a separate one that also accused the spine unit of paying illegal kickbacks to doctors were the basis for a $40 million settlement deal between Medtronic and the government in 2006, according to the settlement document.

"VIP Strip Club" visits for orthopedic surgeons and neurosurgeons? I'm certain that only the most advanced scientific discussions between company and client occurred at such venues.

My questions are:

• Why would any physician allow themself to be taken by a vendor to a strip club? This is a questionable and unprofessional activity on its face, but in the context of vendor marketing to surgeons (presumably male), it is even more appalling. I personally would have rejected such an invitation out of hand as being sleazy and tawdry by its nature.
• Was there a genuine data-driven attempt to evaluate the off-label uses?
• What datasets were being collected by the company and the surgeons to support non-FDA-approved uses of the spinal implant devices?
  
• Who designed those datasets?

Not to mention:

• Did the wives and families of the surgeons know where their husbands and fathers were being taken on their "business trips to Medtronic?"
  

The names of the involved physicians are currently a closely-guarded secret:

The former Medtronic lawyer's allegations are contained in a 2002 suit filed in U.S. District Court in Memphis against Minneapolis-based Medtronic and 10 doctors. The lawsuit and other filings in the case remain sealed, except for a heavily redacted copy of the complaint, which contains none of the doctors' names nor specifics of the allegations.

Medtronic has refused repeated requests from the Senate Finance Committee's staff for an unredacted version. Sen. Grassley, an Iowa Republican, is the panel's ranking minority member.

... The Kelley lawsuit names several top spinal surgeons among the 10 doctor defendants and lists several others as receiving inducements.

The complaint clearly comes from the typical "disgruntled employee":

Ms. Kelley, who now works at another company, alleges she was dismissed by Medtronic after challenging improper payments.

One surgeon's name was apparently made available to the WSJ:

The suit says surgeon Jeffrey Wang, now director of the University of California at Los Angeles's Comprehensive Spine Center, "liked to be taken" to Platinum Plus and emailed Medtronic sales official Brad Hancock saying he was "looking forward to going" to the club with him.

Of course, UCLA has an air-tight explanation for this:

A UCLA spokeswoman said Dr. Wang, who isn't named as a defendant in the suit, "denies ever being entertained by Medtronic at the Platinum club" and doesn't recall sending any such email. If he did send it, she said, "it would have been done so in jest."

In jest? They mean to say, a top surgeon who claims he never went to the club, doesn't recall sending the email --- but if he did actually send it and simply forgot (meaning he would have known a vendor takes doctors on "VIP visits" to strip clubs / houses of prostitution but refused to go himself) then it was just a joke?

On the MedInformaticsMD scale of credibility, that rates about a 0.3 out of 10. It's not even good spin.

All is better now:

Medtronic declined to comment on the lawsuit's allegations. It said it has changed many business practices since the suit was filed, and is "committed to reform and transparency in the industry."

How reassuring.

Actually, not, considering the posts about Medtronic's practices on this blog here, here, here and here, among others.

Also not reassuring was the simplest Google news search on "spinal implant problem medtronic" which returns items like this:

Medtronic Will Settle Accusations on Kickbacks
New York Times - Jul 19, 2006
Medtronic was the subject of two lawsuits filed in Federal District Court in Memphis by whistle-blowers on the actions of its spinal-implant division, ...
All 14 related - Related web pages

Medtronic to settle with doctor over spinal implant invention.
Free with registration - Saint Paul Pioneer Press - AccessMyLibrary.com - Apr 23, 2005
Spinal implant devices are part of a division that accounted for 20 percent of Medtronic's $9.09 billion in total sales last year. In 1999, Medtronic paid ...
Medtronic to Pay $1.35 Bln to End Spinal Doctor... - Bloomberg
Medtronic to buy spine patents, ends legal battle - USA Today
Forbes - San Diego Union Tribune - All 22 related - Related web pages

Medtronic Sofamor Danek's Patent Infringement Lawsuit Begins.
Free with registration - Commercial Appeal - AccessMyLibrary.com - Jun 4, 2004
Medtronic Sofamor Danek and Dr. Gary Michelson are disputing patent rights over the Los Angeles surgeon's inventions in spinal implants, instruments and ...
All 2 related - Related web pages

Medtronic Must Pay Inventor $109 Million, Jury Says (Update3)
Bloomberg - Sep 28, 2004
28 (Bloomberg) -- A US jury told Medtronic Inc., the world's biggest maker of spinal implants, to pay at least $109 million to an inventor for violating ...
Medtronic Must Pay Inventor $109 Million, Jury... - Bloomberg
Memphis, Tenn., jury awards surgeon $110 million... - Commercial Appeal - AccessMyLibrary.com (Free with registration)
All 12 related - Related web pages

Medtronic Must Pay Surgeon $400 Mln Punitive Damages (Update2)
Bloomberg - Oct 12, 2004
Minneapolis-based Medtronic doesn't break out sales of spinal implants. The unit that includes spinal products, as well as ear-nose-and-throat devices, ...
Medtronic ordered to pay $400 million to Los... - Saint Paul Pioneer Press - AccessMyLibrary.com (Free with registration)
$400 Million Judgment Against Medtronic - New York Times
Los Angeles Times - Star Tribune - All 11 related - Related web pages

I'm not even going to attempt to dig any deeper. I fear I may lose my breakfast as a result.

However, hopefully Sen. Grassley and his staff will dig deeper.

A lot deeper.

It's hard for Medical Informaticists and others to help usher in an era of data-driven healthcare when we are competing with strippers and prostitutes for the affection of our surgeons.

-- SS

Addendum:

I am increasingly coming to believe the executive resistance I faced to development of an advanced, very fine-grained, still-used Invasive Cardiology Clinical Database (ICCD) at a major heart center in Delaware late last decade was not based on scientific issues.

This information system could show whether a new device or treatment was effective or not in short order, affecting valuable orders for devices. In fact, in its first year it saved almost $1 million in expense through just that means.

Interestingly, the resistance was from administration and IT, not the doctors, who were the true cheerleaders of the system. Reading the increasingly common stories about the way business is conducted by such companies, I do wonder if cardiac device companies could have been in bed with administration in some way.

Additional addendum 9/28/08:

UC leadership is certainly aware of this issue as well as this posting, after reading it via a Google search on the terms "Medtronic" and "stripper." From the HCRenewal tracking logs:

Domain Name: ucsf.edu ? (Educational)
IP Address: 169.230.242.# (University of California San Francisco)
ISP: University of California, Office of the President
Operating System: Macintosh MacOSX
Browser: Firefox
Time of Visit: Sep 28 2008 6:35:33 pm
Last Page View: Sep 28 2008 6:35:33 pm
Referring URL: http://www.google.co...r&btnG=Google Search
Search Engine: google.com
Search Words: medtronic stripper
Visit Entry Page: http://hcrenewal.blo...eive-her-failed.html
Visit Exit Page: http://hcrenewal.blo...eive-her-failed.html

Post Title → Did Mrs. Jones receive her off-label failed spinal implant via excellent informatics data, or via a surgeon's visit to a prostitute?

Strawmen, Red Herrings, and Liver Transplants for Yakuza

We recently posted about the strange case of four Japanese men, allegedly affiliated with Yakuza criminal organizations, who received liver transplants from the UCLA Medical Center, apparently with some alacrity. All likely paid full list prices for their procedures, and two later donated $100,000 each to the medical center. The case raised concerns by several notables (including Senator Charles Grassley, and Professor Arthur Caplan) about the integrity of the transplant system. Presumably these concerns were based on suspicions that the four may have received a higher priority than others on the list. More concerns should have been raised after it was revealed that shadowy characters threatened a reporter who started to investigate the case in Japan, and the reporter's family (see post here).

So I read with interest an op-ed on the case written by Dr Gerald S Levey, Vice Chancellor of Medical Sciences and Dean of the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA. He sought to address several points.

Troubling questions have been raised by reporting in the Los Angeles Times about whether doctors should consider the moral character or criminal history of patients before saving their lives with an organ transplant. Concerns also have been raised about whether a hospital should accept financial donations from grateful organ recipients, regardless of their backgrounds, and whether foreigners should be able to receive transplants in the U.S.

Dr Levey rebutted those who suggested that transplants should only go to those of good character:

Do we want to force caregivers to make a life-or-death decision based on whether a patient is a 'good' or bad' person?

In addition to medical considerations, UNOS guidelines require some 'nonmedical' judgments, such as whether patient behaviors are likely to result in failure of the new organ, or how well doctors think a transplant candidate would adhere to post-surgery protocols. Teams of physicians, nurses, clinical social workers and other experts make these judgments.

The need to apply these 'nonmedical' criteria relates solely to the future viability of the transplanted organ, not to the intrinsic worthiness of the recipient as a human being. No physician should be making that judgment; to do so would be to impose a death sentence on some patients, and, besides, matters of punishment are best left to the justice system.

The UNOS Ethics Committee states: 'Punitive attitudes that completely exclude those convicted of crimes from receiving medical treatment, including an organ transplant, are not ethically legitimate.' Moreover, doctors are ethically bound by the Hippocratic Oath: 'Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. ... Above all, I must not play at God.'

Regarding financial donations, Dr Levey wrote:

As for the role financial donations, or the promise of them, might play in a patient receiving an organ, the strict rules governing transplant lists as well as periodic audits all but eliminate any possibility of manipulating the process. That said, there is nothing unusual or improper about patients or their families donating money following transplant surgery.

Finally, Dr Levey wrote this about recipients from other countries:

Regarding recipients from other countries, UNOS allows noncitizens to receive U.S. transplants not only for humanitarian reasons but because they are part of the donor pool -- in Southern California, about 20% of donors are foreign-born -- and excluding them might reduce the number of donors. The guidelines call for roughly 95% of all organs to go to Americans, and UCLA Medical Center has abided by this rule.

What I find troubling about this op-ed, written by an experienced physician who is one of the top leaders of UCLA Medical Center, is that it seems to side-step all the important issues. Instead, it deployed a series of straw man arguments and red herrings.

The most conspicuous straw man is the notion that UCLA is under attack by people who believe their should be a moral test for receiving any medical care, or that criminals should not receive any medical care. I haven't seen any suggestions that the major problem in this case was that criminals received medical treatment, per se. Instead, the concern seemed to be that people who could pay list prices, and were likely to give further donations to the institution on top of those payments, might have received higher priority for transplantation of scarce organs, despite their criminal ties.

Furthermore, the issue of moral worthiness for treatment gets a bit more complicated in the case of organ transplants, which require use of a scarce resource, a donated organ, that if given to one patient does not go to another. As Dr Levey pointed out, physicians must consider whether "patient behaviors are likely to result in the failure of the new organ." Certain kinds of behaviors common among members of organized crime might affect the likelihood of such failure. Some such behaviors may also appear to be immoral.

Leaving aside such complexities for the moment, Dr Levey never directly addressed the issue of whether criminals who paid list price, and also in some cases, made additional donations, might have been given a higher priority than ordinary patients whose insurance companies would have paid less, and were not wealthy enough to make additional donations.

He also failed to affirm that the four transplant recipients in question received transplants in strict accordance with their medical conditions and their resultant position on the priority list. Instead, he described how the process is supposed to work:

Under the guidelines, the liver transplant system is based primarily on disease severity. Patients are placed on a list, and UNOS prioritizes them according to need. As livers become available, organ procurement agencies match them to those at the top of the list, based on such factors as travel time, blood type of organ and patient and the quality of the organ.

But the decision as to whether a particular organ is best for a given patient must be made by the patient's physician. If the physician decides it can't be used for the patient designated by UNOS, the organ goes to the next person on the UNOS list, who may be waiting for the procedure at another hospital.

This appears to be something of a red herring. Nobody was arguing that the current transplant prioritization process is likely to give priority to patients who pay full list price, and are likely to make additional donations, even if they have a criminal background in another country. The questions were whether the process worked the way it should have in this case, whether it has loopholes, and whether some breakdown of the process facilitated these particular transplants. Dr Levey did not address these questions.

Dr Levey employed two other sets of straw men and red herrings.

Raising concerns about whether financial donations per se affected the patients' priority for transplants was another straw man argument. I don't believe anyone was arguing that hospitals should not accept donations from grateful patients. This was coupled to another red herring. Dr Levey reiterated that rigorous procedures "all but eliminate any possibility of manipulating the process." The issue was not about the the probability of manipulation. It was about whether manipulation occurred in this case.

Raising concerns about whether foreigners should get transplants was a final straw man argument. I don't believe anyone was arguing that patients should be denied transplants because they came from outside the US. Furthermore, Dr Levey's response, focused on foreign-born donors, was another. Maybe he should have cited statistics about how many donors were initially banned from entering the US due to alleged criminal activity, and only allowed on because of promises to reveal information about gang activity in this country.

In my humble opinion, the case of the Yakuza liver transplants raises some real questions about whether the process of allocating transplants miscarried in these specific circumstances. It is disappointing that a top official of the involved medical school chose to to avoid this issue when discussing the case. Furthermore, it is more disappointing that he did not condemn any threats that may have been meant to discourage reporting of the health care provided by his institution, and to offer some support for anyone who might have received such threats. Doing so would have given his declaration that his institution needs "to be accountable to the public" a bit more weight.

Post Title → Strawmen, Red Herrings, and Liver Transplants for Yakuza

The Worst Example of the Anechoic Effect? - "Erase the Story or Be Erased. Your Family, Too."

We posted earlier this week about how the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) let four alleged members of the Yakuza, that is, Japanese organized criminal gangs, into the US in the hope that they would talk about their gangs' activities in this country. One attractive aspect of visiting the US for the four was apparently the opportunity to get liver transplants at UCLA Medical Center. That hospital provided the transplants with with some alacrity, for which the four apparently paid full list prices. Later, two of the four also gave UCLA Medical Center substantial contributions. But none of them gave the FBI much useful information.

In the post, I briefly mentioned that a reporter who was on the trail of this story in Japan was warned off by a threatening message from some shadowy strangers. That reporter, Jake Adelstein, left a comment on our original post, and a link to an article he wrote in the Washington Post about his reporting on the Yakuza in Japan:

Three years ago, [alleged Yakuza boss Tadamasa] Goto got word that I was reporting an article about his liver transplant. A few days later, his underlings obliquely threatened me. Then came a formal meeting. The offer was straightforward. 'Erase the story or be erased,' one of them said. 'Your family too.'

I knew enough to take the threat seriously. So I took some advice from a senior Japanese detective, abandoned the scoop and resigned from the Yomiuri Shimbun two months later. But I never forgot the story. I planned to write about it in a book, figuring that, with Goto's poor health, he'd be dead by the time it came out. Otherwise, I planned to clip out the business of his operation at the last minute.

I didn't bargain on the contents leaking out before my book was released, which is what happened last November. Now the FBI and local law enforcement are watching over my family in the States, while the Tokyo police and the NPA look out for me in Japan. I would like to go home, but Goto has a reputation for taking out his target and anyone else in the vicinity.

In early March, in my presence, an FBI agent asked the NPA to provide a list of all the members of Goto's organization so that they could stop them from coming into the country and killing my family. The NPA was reluctant at first, citing 'privacy concerns,' but after much soul-searching handed over about 50 names. But the Tokyo police file lists more than 900 members. I know this because someone posted the file online in the summer of 2007; a Japanese detective was fired because of the leak.

Of course, I'm a little biased. I don't think it's selfish of me to value the safety of my family more than the personal privacy of crooks. And as a crime reporter, I'm baffled that the Japanese don't share intelligence on the yakuza with the United States.

This more detailed version is even more chilling. We have often talked about the anechoic effect, the phenomenon that stories about mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and corruption of the leadership of health care organizations, and resulting threats to physicians' core values get much less attention than they are seemingly worse. One obvious reason for this is that people within health care may fear that discussion of such issues may jeopardize their careers. Ill-informed, conflicted, and even corrupt leaders may not like their errors or misdeeds exposed in public.

However, I don't think we have previously heard of anyone whose life, or whose family's lives were threatened because they publicized a story of questionable health care leadership. So the present case may be the worst example of the anechoic effect yet revealed.

But to return to the health care end of it - maybe the leaders, physician and lay, of UCLA medical center should reflect on their decision to give Mr Goto and his associates special, at least more rapid treatment because they paid cash, and because of the possibility they would contribute future money to the institution, in light of the threats made against Mr Adelstein and his family. Does an institution that is supposed to try to save and prolong lives want to take contributions from people who threaten the lives of people who question those contributions?

Post Title → The Worst Example of the Anechoic Effect? - "Erase the Story or Be Erased. Your Family, Too."

For a Few Yen More: UCLA, Liver Transplants, and the Yakuza

Sometimes, you just can't make this stuff up.... As reported last week in the Los Angeles Times, UCLA [University of California - Los Angeles] Medical Center performed liver transplants on four people with apparent ties to Japanese organized crime.

UCLA Medical Center and its most accomplished liver surgeon provided a life-saving transplant to one of Japan's most powerful gang bosses, law enforcement sources told The Times.

In addition, the surgeon performed liver transplants at UCLA on three other men who are now barred from entering the United States because of their criminal records or suspected affiliation with Japanese organized crime groups, said a knowledgeable law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The most prominent transplant recipient, Tadamasa Goto, had been barred from entering the U.S. because of his criminal history, several current and former law enforcement officials said. Goto leads a gang called the Goto-gumi, which experts describe as vindictive and at times brutal.

The FBI helped Goto obtain a visa to enter the United States in 2001 in exchange for leads on potentially illegal activity in this country by Japanese criminal gangs, said Jim Stern, retired chief of the FBI's Asian criminal enterprise unit in Washington.

Goto got his liver, Stern said, but provided the bureau with little useful information on Japanese gangs.

'I don't think Goto gave the bureau anything of significance,'Stern said. Goto 'came to the States and got a liver and was laughing back to where he came from. . . . It defies logic.'

These transplants were done at a time when the supply of livers for transplantation was limited.

In the year of Goto's surgery, 186 people in the Los Angeles region died waiting for a liver, U.S. transplant statistics show.

One factor was apparently that the particularJapanese transplant recipients could pay cash.

Typically, transplant experts say, foreigners cannot receive transplants at U.S. centers unless they are willing to pay the full cost of the procedure out of pocket -- without the substantial discounts given to insurers. Charges for a liver transplant and immediate follow-up care generally exceed $523,000, according to an April report by Milliman Inc., an actuarial firm.

A subsequent article (May 31, 2008) in the LA Times further noted that two of the Japanese transplant recipients made substantial "donations" to the hospital after their procedures.

A powerful Japanese gang boss who received a liver transplant at UCLA Medical Center donated $100,000 to the Westwood hospital shortly after the surgery, The Times has learned.

A plaque dated November 2001 at the entryway to a seventh-floor surgery office reads, 'In grateful recognition of the Goto Research Fund established through the generosity of Mr. Tadamasa Goto.'

UCLA also acknowledged that it received a separate $100,000 donation from another man who figured in Thursday's story. He donated in 2002, the year of his transplant.

The man was identified by a law enforcement official as one of four Japanese men now barred from entering the United States because of their suspected gang affiliations, criminal records, or both.

Finally, one previous attempt to report this story was stopped by apparent intimidation, as reported in the May 30, LA Times article.

Jake Adelstein, a former reporter at Japan's largest daily newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, said he received a tip about the circumstances surrounding Goto's liver transplant in 2005. Within days of making inquiries, however, Adelstein was visited by men who told him: 'Erase the story or be erased,' he said in an interview.

The story aroused concern for the integrity of the US transplant system. From the May 31, article:

Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who has considerable influence on federal health policy and an interest in transplant oversight going back several years, said he was "worried about the credibility of the transplant system" and would demand additional information from the university.

If the transplant system 'doesn't have credibility, we're not going to have people donate organs,' said Grassley, the senior Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, which oversees federal hospital funds. 'I think I have to get to the bottom of things.'

Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, said hospitals have a responsibility to inquire about the source of their gifts.

'It starts to defy credulity that you're not going to be curious about who these people are, if only to ask them for more money down the road,' he said. 'Any development officer who didn't follow up a $100,000 gift with a check of who this guy is and who his friends are would be an ex-development officer.'

Wealthy foreigners, he added, are attractive to transplant programs because not only do they pay the full cost for their procedures, but they often make gifts of gratitude later.

One L.A. doctor said he believes that UCLA's reputation as a first-class transplant center will suffer from the news of the four transplants.

'It's going to have a real negative effect,' said Dr. David Boska, an internist in Brentwood who says he has referred 10 patients to UCLA over the last decade. 'Their interest is to make sure people know they have a first-rate program. This isn't going to help.'

Boska, who said he is a friend of Busuttil, added: 'I have lost faith in the system, not the program,' he said.

'You have a brother who dies because he doesn't have $500,000 to spend on a liver. That's a terrible thing to think about. Then you learn that we have foreign criminals who come in and get livers. That's not good.'

This seems to be yet another flagrant example of what happens when academic medical institutions put making money ahead of their mission, and ahead of physicians' core values. Now we seem to have a formerly revered academic medical center putting gangsters at the head of the transplant queue, as long as they pay the list price in cash and add some "donations" afterwards. Presumably, four patients, who may have had some kind of health insurance, but who did not have enough cash to pay the "list price" and then make another $100,000 donation, did not get those livers. Physicians are sworn to put the interests of their patients first, but in this case, patients with more money, however it may have been acquired, were first of all.

This case makes a striking argument for the need to drastically reform the leadership and governance of health care organizations, and academic medical centers in particular.

Finally, note that the story was suppressed for years, apparently in part due to dire threats by shadowy figures to the reporter who first looked into the story. This add a new dimension to the anechoic effect.

Post Title → For a Few Yen More: UCLA, Liver Transplants, and the Yakuza

Physicians, Academic Health Centers, and Pharmaceutical Companies' Marketing Campaigns: A Perspective from the "Real World of Rodeo Drive"

An article in the Los Angeles Times opened an intriguing window into relationships between physician, pharmaceutical companies, and academic health centers involved in pharmaceutical companies' efforts to increase awareness of conditions for which they plan to market treatments. The article focused on Dr. Jennifer Berman, a urologist with an interest in women's sexual health. Berman came to the UCLA Health Center from Boston University to open a Female Sexual Medicine Center.

• After participating in a conference to define "female sexual dysfunction," funded by eight pharmaceutical companies, Berman found, "It was at its peak, all of the schmoozing and wining and dining. Every night you're out - one night with Bayer, the next night with Pfizer."
• "While in Boston, Berman began consulting for Pfizer, Bayer, Procter & Gamble, Eli Lilly - 'All of them.' According to Berman, the companies figured out that 'Hey, she's pretty and nice and great, and can communicate.' They asked her to do educational campaigns. 'Once you deal with the marketing side,' she says, 'there's usually more resources.'"
• "While at UCLA, Berman was a paid drug company expert for media campaigns that publicized low female libido and other maladies. By her account, Pfizer paid for studies she developed and conducted, including some that measured Viagra's effects on women. She broadcast the drug's potential benefits for women on 'Berman & Berman,' the Discovery Health cable-TV series that she co-hosted with her younger sister, sex therapist Laura Berman."
• "Less visible was another joint Berman endeavor, orchestrating media campaigns via satellite. 'You sit down in front of a camera in a sutdio and go on lots of news programs around the country, talking about the issue of the day or the public awareness issue you're promoting,' Laura says. For Procter & Gamble - which was hoping to market its own testosterone patch to increase female sexual desire - they heightened awareness of female libido issues. They discussed bladder health for Ocean Spray, herpes for Levitra, birth control for Seasonale and spotlighted other issues for Bayer and other clients. Jennifer didn't see any conflicts of interest with her scholarly work, because 'I was very careful not to endorse any particular product, just create awareness of a particular disease.'"
• "Jennifer says UCLA took a commission from fees earned from the TV show and media campaigns, which Laura says brought from $10,000 to $75,000 or more per day. Roxanne Yamaguchi Moster, media relations director for UCLA Health Sciences, says the university collected its 'standard overhead deduction ' of 12.5% for the Discovery Health show. "
• The Bermans promoted off-label use of Viagra for female sexual arousal difficulties on their website and on their "Berman & Berman" TV show. "'I thought it was just for men,' a guest on the show says. 'Well, you're gonna learn,' Jennifer responds, handing another woman 100 milligrams of Viagra and a vibrator and leaving her behind a partition with an erotic video while Jennifer measures her physical responses. Later in the show, Laura welcomes Hugh Hefner, 'the poster child for Viagra,' and a voice-over says: 'Thinking about trying Viagra? It's now available from your doctor in a free six-pill sample box.'"

Berman has her share of critics. Said Dr. Irwin Goldstein, "These people are into aromatherapy and media and message. [Jennifer] didn't want to be in our world. I presume her world is more lucrative." John Bancroft, a former director of the Kinsey Institute, said "There's been vigorous research in this field, almost all of it funded by the pharmaceutical industry, and I think it has ended up with having a bias toward medicalizing these problems. The Berman sisters have been quite succesful in getting into the media and bringing attention to themselves. I don't have a lot of respect for them scientifically.... They haven't let scientific evidence get in their way." And Leonore Tiefer from New York University School of Medicine said "Jennifer had some interesting scientific plans." Then, "this whole PR thing exploded. As sson as [the Bermans] got [to Los Angeles], I saw much more commercialization than research. It's a shame...."
Dr. Jennifer Berman eventually left the UCLA Health Center. "She attributed the 'weird undermining stuff happening' at UCLA partly to sexism in the male-dominated urology department and partly out of jealousy about her television appearances and cash-based medical practice."
Dr. Berman is opening up a new practice at the Rodeo Drive Women's Health Center. "She can't help but feel liberated. 'In the real world out here on Rodeo Drive,' she says, waving at the clothing stores, 'nobody knows from grants or papers, or for that matter cares. They want you to be respected and knowledgeable and a good doctor.'"
From someone who wonders whether Rodeo Drive is "the real world,".... This is a striking example of how pharmaceutical companies recruit physicians and academic health centers to promote awareness of ostensible health problems, for generous fees. The recipients of the cash may rationalize their participation as informing the public, and as not directly related to their research. However, the big issue is not whether such funding amounted to a conflict of interest for their research (although in my humble opinion, it clearly did.) The big issue is that unless all these marketing efforts were clearly identified as paid for and orchestrated by their pharmaceutical company sponsors, they were obviously deceptive.

Post Title → Physicians, Academic Health Centers, and Pharmaceutical Companies' Marketing Campaigns: A Perspective from the "Real World of Rodeo Drive"

Wash. Post on Cedars-Sinai CPOE failure

For anyone who doubts clinical IT is an area where angels fear to tread, there's this story in the Washington Post:

Cedars-Sinai Doctors Cling to Pen and Paper
By Ceci Connolly, Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, March 21, 2005

Excerpts, with notable passages in bold and my interspersed comments in italics:

... For every doctor, nurse and executive here, there is a different explanation of what went wrong. The technology, created in-house, was clunky and slow. Only a fraction of the 2,000 doctors with privileges at the hospital were involved in developing the system, even though they faced a dramatic change in the way they practiced medicine, from jotting notes on a clipboard to logging onto a computer to type in their treatment and medication orders. Training was insufficient, and administrators opted for what Hackmeyer called a "big bang" implementation rather than switching one ward at a time.

Now, two years later, the hospital often viewed as an industry leader is being held up as a cautionary tale in the drive toward bringing medicine into the computer age, and officials here say they have no intention of trying again for at least a year.
(note: my opinion on their initial remediation plans were published in Health-IT World in Sept. 2004 -- SS)
The marriage of information technology and medicine is all the rage in health policy circles. Five years after the Institute of Medicine issued a landmark report cataloguing the life-and-death consequences of medical errors, corporate leaders, politicians and physicians are embracing computer-assisted health care.

Yet the spectacular failure at Cedars-Sinai -- described by Bush's technology guru as "the worst case" he has seen -- demonstrates how difficult it can be to make the transition. Even well-financed, sophisticated hospitals face enormous hurdles moving from the Marcus Welby era of pen and paper to one in which doctors spend precious minutes entering data into a machine that never went to medical school and does not have the flexibility to make nuanced judgment calls.
(Neither did most of the IT people developing and leading implementation of such machines, but that seems a problem that is rarely addressed -- SS.)
... "The important lesson of the Cedars-Sinai case is that electronic health record implementation is risky," David J. Brailer, national coordinator for health information technology, said in an interview. "Up to 30 percent fail."
(We're talking billions of dollars of capital and expense dollars that hospitals simply do not have an abundance of -- SS)

... Each time a patient arrived, pulmonary specialist Andrew S. Wachtel would have to find a computer (preferably one of the newer, faster ones), log in and begin checking boxes in at least a half-dozen categories to indicate the patient's symptoms, allergies, diagnosis, tests and medications. A task that once took three minutes to scribble shorthand at the patient's bedside suddenly devoured 30 to 40 minutes, he said.
(Reminds me of the passage in the book "House of God" about finding a medical student who only triples an intern's work - SS)

... even techies found flaws. The system refused to recognize even slight misspellings, so Hackmeyer's efforts to order the laxative Dulcolax -- easily understood by nurses even if he was off by a letter or two -- were thwarted by the computer. It was also impossible to use it to order "clear liquids and advance diet as tolerated," another routine instruction when easing a patient back to solid foods, he said.
(Even Microsoft Word does a better job on typos than that -- SS)
... But the biggest complaint -- with potentially dangerous implications -- involved the automatic alerts that flashed on the screen every time a doctor made an out-of-the-ordinary request. Designed to catch errors before they occur, the alerts became an unending series of questions, reminders and requests on fairly basic decisions.
Infectious disease specialist Stephen Uman said he went around in circles trying to give patients the antibiotic Vancomycin. Although the recommended dosage is 928 milligrams, Uman knows to round up to 1 gram because pharmacies dispense the medication in multiples of 250 milligrams. But when he typed 1 gram into the computer, the machine rejected the request.

Cedars-Sinai was unable to strike a balance between useful computer warnings and a machine that seemed to constantly cry wolf, acknowledged Harold, the former chief of staff. "Buried in those annoying alerts is probably one life-saving alert," he said.
("Unable" to strike a balance? That sounds like an interesting story in itself. -- SS)
... Even with that data, Cedars-Sinai is in no rush to try again. The hospital is waiting for the technology to improve and perhaps for more young, tech-savvy doctors to arrive. In the meantime, Neil Romanoff, the physician who oversees safety procedures here, said the hospital relies on extra layers of staff to double- and triple-check its procedures.

The technology will improve when those behind it have a better grasp of the complexities of medicine. Pioneers in EMR such as Morris Collen, Donald Lindberg, Octo Barnett, and others published guidelines on how to best implement clinical IT that warned against the cornucopia of problems mentioned in this article. Sadly, they did so starting in -- and perhaps even before -- the 1960's.
A good source on references to the wisdom of the pioneers is "A History of Medical Informatics in the United States 1950-1990, by Morris Collen MD, section 3.4. For example, Octo Barnett's clinical IT "10 Commandments" (written in 1970) as reproduced in Collen's book on page 169, as well as 1960's and 70's material by Lindberg, Lamson, Collen, Davis, Baker, and numerous others address many of the substantial problems encountered by Cedars-Sinai in 2003 as documented above.

Medical informaticists are specifically educated in the necessity of minimizing the problems mentioned above, I should add, yet often are not sufficiently empowered to effect change. In my case, efforts to avoid such issues in clinical IT projects were often resisted by IT personnel who "knew better" than the "informatics guy" whose ideas were "way out there" (the actual words of an executive in charge of IT, as reported to me by people who disliked his micromanagerial and bullying style. Of note, that executive is now a CEO at a major healthcare facility).

-- SS

Post Title → Wash. Post on Cedars-Sinai CPOE failure