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Showing posts with label University of Miami. Show all posts
Showing posts with label University of Miami. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

IMPEACHMENT: IT’S ABOUT THE INSTITUTION, NOT THE PERSON

IMPEACHMENT: IT’S ABOUT THE INSTITUTION, NOT THE PERSON

The impeachment trial of Judge G. Thomas Porteous of Louisiana this week was a lesson in civic ethics. The lessons of the Porteous trial apply to academic medical centers, professional medical societies, medical journals, and granting agencies like NIH.

The Porteous trial is a straightforward case of bribes, kickbacks and corruption involving a Federal judge. The most enlightening arguments came from prosecutor Rep. Adam Schiff, D-California, laying out the case for impeachment in the Senate. He gave a lucid presentation of the logic and the historical origins of the impeachment process. The key points are these: impeachment serves to protect the dignity, honor, and credibility of the office more than to punish the wayward office holder; and impeachment is a constitutionally sanctioned way to clean the Augean stables without necessarily having to prove criminal liability. It is sufficient to demonstrate that the bad actors have brought disgrace on their offices.

What this means for us in medicine is that legalistic charges and defenses are not the right way to go in exposing and ejecting bad actors from our field. In the highly publicized cases of ethical compromise over the past few years, our group disapproval, when there was any at all, generally has run on two parallel tracks. The first is legalistic, and it favors the bad actors, who flaunt their constitutional protections with the taunt, prove it. The second ground of disapproval is esthetic, based on the tackiness of the bad actors’ behaviors – regardless of technical legalities, what they do is an affront and an insult to professional standards and mores. When we look at how recent incidents in medicine actually played out, however, we see a disconnect. The bad actors have narrowed the debate to the first ground of disapproval, while forcing the second off limits. In this strategy, they have received conscious or unconscious assistance from the professional establishment. The focus has been on legal technicalities involving the bad actors rather on preserving the dignity and credibility of high offices in academic medicine.

For instance, when Charles Nemeroff was exposed by Senator Grassley for conflict of interest in his NIH grants, he came up with the contrived legalistic defense that his unreported payments from GlaxoSmithKline were for ‘CME-like’ presentations, and thus somehow exempt from disclosure. Nemeroff’s obfuscations finally collapsed of their own weight and Emory University took decisive action against him, even though they had sufficient evidence dating back at least 4-5 years. In the end, Emory had to go through the wringer to discipline Nemeroff, and the institution suffered grave damage to its reputation for a number of years as the price of delay.

For instance, when Thomas Insel, the Director of NIMH, assured Pascal Goldschmidt, Dean of the School of Medicine at the University of Miami, that Nemeroff was absolutely in good standing for applying for new NIH grants if he left Emory for Miami, despite a 2-year ban at Emory, he hewed to the letter of the law while disregarding its spirit in order to help his friend. Moreover, when Insel appointed Nemeroff to two new NIH Research Review Committees, he established beyond any doubt that he was intent on trying to help Nemeroff get back into circulation, and that he failed to grasp the gravity of the dishonor that Nemeroff inflicted on the field. This obtuseness on Insel’s part damaged the credibility and reputation of NIMH. To his credit, NIH director Francis Collins finally ‘got it’ and forced a review of the NIH ethics rules that had been entrusted to Insel.

For instance, when Pascal Goldschmidt, Dean of the School of Medicine at the University of Miami, claimed he had done due diligence in his recruitment of Nemeroff as chair of his psychiatry department in 2009, he focused on the legalistic aspects of Emory’s review of Nemeroff, while failing to understand the degree of negative publicity associated with Nemeroff’s name. He ended up hiring someone who is an object of ridicule, and he in turn is ridiculed by association.

For instance, when Stanford University learned of Alan Schatzberg’s boundary violations vis a vis his NIH-funded projects and his personal corporation, they first pushed back on legalistic technical grounds. Only later did the Stanford administration get the message by removing Schatzberg from his Principal Investigator role with NIH grants, and eventually appointing a new chair of psychiatry. Meanwhile, the public image of Stanford suffered.

For instance, when the American Psychiatric Association was warned that Alan Schatzberg was a problematic candidate for election as President of the association on account of his history of ethical compromise, they went ahead anyway and they have since had opportunity to regret that decision. Here again, the professional society appears to have lost sight of the ethical forest for the legal trees. The credibility and reputation of the APA have suffered because of the taint associated with Schatzberg’s presidency.

For instance, when the New York Times recently exposed the ghostwriting associated with the 1999 textbook of Charles Nemeroff and Alan Schatzberg, the so-called authors responded with typical legalistic defenses. They and the University of Miami and the American Psychiatric Association Press (the publisher) again lost sight of the ethical forest for the legal trees. This stereotyped, public relations driven response ignores the visceral and esthetic distaste most observers felt on learning about the collusion between the ‘authors,’ the professional writing company and the sponsoring pharmaceutical corporation. Even the defense that it occurred a long time ago fails. In the Porteous trial, the prosecution established that dishonorable events in an officer’s past are grounds for impeachment, whether or not they also occurred during the person’s time in office.

For instance, when Harvard Medical School planned a new CME program on psychopharmacology in mid-2011, they engaged a number of compromised academic speakers, including Nemeroff and Schatzberg. What the hell was Harvard thinking? I told the Course Director, Carl Salzman, that this amounts to pandering. He replied defensively that Nemeroff and Schatzberg are well regarded speakers and that he would ensure that they gave unbiased presentations. That’s not the point. The point is that they have done serious damage to our field, and for Harvard Medical School to give them top billing amounts to denial of the elephant in the living room. It’s collusion in service of their public rehabilitation. I told Dr. Salzman that his logic amounts to compartmentalized thinking. I might have added that Adolf Hitler gave a lot of great speeches that received rave reviews and that compartmentalized thinking was widespread in the nation of Germany between 1928 and 1945. Meanwhile, Harvard Medical School gets a black eye through its association with these compromised individuals. So do the other speakers who will be on the panel. Who needs this kind of taint? Dr. Salzman can defend Nemeroff and Schatzberg all he wants on specious legalistic grounds, but who cares? Harvard Medical School could use some moral clarity.

So, we come back to the impeachment trial of Judge Porteous. Impeachment protects the institution. When sleazebags get into positions of authority and trust they need to be dumped, and our professional and academic institutions need to have enough spine to dump them. At the very least, we don’t need to tolerate institutions like Harvard Medical School pandering to compromised academic bad actors. For shame.

Post Title IMPEACHMENT: IT’S ABOUT THE INSTITUTION, NOT THE PERSON

Monday, March 20, 2006

The Questionable Timing of UnitedHealth Group's CEO's Stock Options

A Wall Street Journal article (not yet available on the web, but summarized here) alleged that some prominent US corporations have back-dated the stock options granted top managers with the effect of enhancing their total compensation.

To quote the article,

The Securities and Exchange Commission is examining whether some option grants carry favorable grant dates for a different reason: They were backdated. The SEC is understood to be looking at about a dozen companies' option grants with this in mind.

The Journal's analysis of grant dates and stock movements suggests the problem may be broader. It identified several companies with wildly improbable option-grant patterns. While this doesn't prove chicanery, it shows something very odd: Year after year, some companies' top executives received options on unusually propitious dates. (An explanation of the methodology is below.)

The analysis bolsters recent academic work suggesting that backdating was widespread, particularly from the start of the tech- stock boom in the 1990s through the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform act of 2002. If so, it was another way some executives enriched themselves during the boom at shareholders' expense. And because options grants are long-lived, some executives holding backdated grants from the late 1990s could still profit from them today.

Stock options give recipients a right to buy company stock at a set price, called the exercise price or strike price. The right usually doesn't vest for a year or more, but then it continues for several years. The exercise price is usually the stock's 4 p.m. price on the date of the grant, an average of the day's high and low, or the 4 p.m. price the day before. Naturally, the lower it is, the more money the recipient can potentially make someday by exercising the options.

A key purpose of stock options is to give recipients an incentive to improve their employer's performance, including its stock price. No stock gain, no profit on the options. Backdating them so they carry a lower price would run counter to this goal, by giving the recipient a paper gain right from the start.

Companies have a right to give executives lavish compensation if they choose to, but they can't mislead shareholders about it. Granting an option at a price below the current market value, while not illegal in itself, could result in false disclosure. That's because companies grant their options under a shareholder-approved "option plan" on file with the SEC. The plans typically say options will carry the stock price of the day the company awards them or the day before. If it turns out they carry some other price, the company could be in violation of its options plan, and potentially vulnerable to an allegation of securities fraud.
The article particularly emphasized how UnitedHealth Group, the large commercial managed care organization, granted stock options to its CEO, Dr William W McGuire.

The Journal's analysis raises questions about one of the most lucrative stock-option grants ever. On Oct. 13, 1999, William W. McGuire, CEO of giant insurer UnitedHealth Group Inc., got an enormous grant in three parts that -- after adjustment for later stock splits -- came to 14.6 million options. So far, he has exercised about 5% of them, for a profit of about $39 million. As of late February he had 13.87 million unexercised options left from the October 1999 tranche. His profit on those, if he exercised them today, would be about $717 million more.

The 1999 grant was dated the very day UnitedHealth stock hit its low for the year. Grants to Dr. McGuire in 1997 and 2000 were also dated on the day with those years' single lowest closing price. A grant in 2001 came near the bottom of a sharp stock dip. In all, the odds of such a favorable pattern occurring by chance would be one in 200 million or greater. Odds such as those are 'stronomical,'said David Yermack, an associate professor of finance at New York University, who reviewed the Journal's methodology and has studied options-timing issues.

Until last year, UnitedHealth had a very unusual policy: It let Dr. McGuire choose the day of his own option grants. According to his 1999 employment agreement, he is supposed to choose dates by giving "oral notification" to the chairman of the company's compensation committee. The agreement says the exercise price shall be the stock's closing price on the date the grants are issued.

Arthur Meyers, an executive-compensation attorney with Seyfarth Shaw LLP in Boston, said a contract such as that sounded 'ike a thinly disguised attempt to pick the lowest grant price possible.'Mr. Meyers said such a pact could pose several legal issues, possibly violating Internal Revenue Service and stock-exchange listing rules that require directors to set a CEO's compensation. "If he picks the date of his grant, he has arguably set a portion of his pay. It's just not good corporate governance."
These allegations seem to clash with UnitedHealth Group's mission statement, which expressly includes, "making health care more affordable." Making huge stock option grants to its CEO, as we have mentioned before, hardly seem to be a way to make health care more affordable. Gimmicking the timing of the grants to increase his compensation just adds salt to the wound, and reinforces the concern that large health care organizations may be run more for the benefit of their top executives than for any other purpose.

One wonders what sort of oversight the UnitedHealth Group board of directors was providing. Maybe director Donna Shalala, who also has the seemingly conflicting job of being president of the University of Miami, and hence the person ultimately responsible for the operation of its medical school and academic medical center, was too busy enjoying her lavish lifestyle.
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Post Title The Questionable Timing of UnitedHealth Group's CEO's Stock Options

Monday, February 27, 2006

A Tale of Three Ironies: University of Miami's Janitors Still Have No Health Insurance

There are no lack of ironies in an emerging story about the University of Miami.

There has been an ongoing dispute involving the university, and a company called Unicco with which it contracts to provide janitorial services, and the Unicco's local employees. The Service Employee's International Union (SEIU) has been trying to organize the janitors. Recently, in one of its statements, a janitor who has worked for at the university for 25 years and makes $6.80 an hour claimed, "I was here the first time the university formed a committe to talk about our wages. I was making barely over minimum wages then, and I still am now." (See the Miami Herald story here.)

The union has just taken a strike authorization vote. In support of the vote, a worked at the university's down-town medical campus, which includes Jackson Memorial Hospital, said, "I am expected to clean the medical facilities at Jackson without safety equipment, without gloves, without training, and without health insurance, all for $6.40 an hour." (See the South Florida Business Journal article here.)

So the first irony is that the maintenance workers at the University of Miami medical center do not have health insurance provided by their employer.

What makes this story more interesting is how impetus built for the recent escalation of this dispute.

Two weeks ago, the New York Times ran a relevant article (available here, but requires subscription to view.) Was the article about health care policy? Not really. It was a Times Magazine profile in "The Way We Live Now" series about University of Miami President Donna Shalala, the former Secretary of Health and Human Services in the Clinton administration, and one of the principal advocates of Clinton's health care reform plan, which was meant to provide universal health care insurance.

According to the Times, Shalala lives in a 9000 square foot mansion (owned by the university), with mango trees in the garden. She drives a Lexus (hybrid, naturally). She owns a 29 foot boat, but doesn't get to use it much. She has house-hold help who makes her bed for her.

After the Times article was published, a Washington Post commentator wrote,
Note to the Haves: When involved in a labor dispute, skip the luxury home profile.

Then the story hit the blogsphere. Wonkette's post on the story was entitled, "Let Them Eat Mangoes."

So the second irony is obvious.

But there is a third irony.

Not reported by any newspaper, so far, is another responsibility Shalala now has. In her spare time, Shalala is a director of UnitedHealth Group, the parent company for the UnitedHealth managed care organization, and hence has a fiduciary duty to the UnitedHealth. This company's mission statement includes,
UnitedHealth Group is a diversified health and well-being company dedicated to making the health care system work better. The company directs its resources into designing products, providing services and applying technologies that:
* Improve access to health and well-being services;
* Simplify the health care experience;
* Promote quality; and,
* Make health care more affordable.
The benefits received by directors are as follows, per United's 2005 proxy statement,


Directors who are not Company employees receive an annual retainer of $30,000, a $1,500 fee for attending each Board meeting in person ($750 for attending by telephone), and a $1,000 fee for attending each committee meeting in person ($500 for attending by telephone). Directors also receive the standard fee for attendance by telephone if they are unable to attend a meeting, but receive an update by telephone prior to or after the meeting. In addition, we pay the Chairman of each of the Audit Committee and the Compensation and Human Resources Committee an annual retainer of $5,000.
We provide health care coverage to current and past directors who are not eligible for coverage under another group health care benefit program or Medicare.
Non-employee directors also receive grants of non-qualified stock options under the UnitedHealth Group Incorporated 2002 Stock Incentive Plan (the “Stock Incentive Plan”). Under the Stock Incentive Plan (and terms approved by the Compensation and Human Resources Committee with respect to non-employee director grants made pursuant to the Stock Incentive Plan), our non-employee directors receive three types of option grants: (1) initial one-time grants of non-qualified stock options to purchase 36,000 shares of our common stock; (2) quarterly grants of non-qualified stock options to purchase 5,000 shares of our common stock; and (3) conversion grants made pursuant to an election by a director to convert annual retainer and meeting attendance fees into options to purchase our common stock.
The initial grants are made automatically on the date the eligible director is first elected to the Board of Directors and become exercisable over the following three years at the rate of 12,000 shares per year. The quarterly grants are made automatically on the first business day of each fiscal quarter and become exercisable immediately upon grant. The conversion grants are made on the day of each regularly scheduled Board meeting and become exercisable immediately upon grant. The number of shares covered by a conversion option will equal four times the amount of the retainer and meeting fees foregone, divided by the fair market value of one share of our common stock on the date of grant.

According to the proxy, Shalala had received options for 30,000 shares of stock by 2005.

Gotta love those mangoes.

Post Title A Tale of Three Ironies: University of Miami's Janitors Still Have No Health Insurance

Monday, May 23, 2005

Conflicts of Interest and Jackson Memorial Hospital's Pharmacy Contract

The latest in the hit-parade of hospital management shenanigans, highlighting issues of conflict of interest, is this story in the Miami Herald.
The newspaper's investigation has uncovered a story of dubious management at Jackson Memorial Hospital, a major University of Miami teaching hospital.
In summary, after hospital President Ira Clark had announced his retirement in 2002, in 2003, the hospital's Fiscal Affairs Committee, chaired by Andres Murai Jr, hired Alson L. Cook as Vice President of Logistics, at a salary of $160,000. Cook advocated giving Cardinal Health a five-year, no-bid contract to manage Jackson Memorial's pharmacy, and to control its drug purchasing, worth $85 million a year.
Murai, it turns out, also is President and CEO of Berna Products Corp, a subsidiary of Acambis plc, which sells a typhoid vaccine to Cardinal Health.
The contract between Jackson Memorial and Cardinal in retrospect also had a significant built-in conflict of interest. "One branch of Cardinal was telling Jackson how much to pay for drugs - purchased from another branch of Cardinal," according to the Herald.
Cardinal's staff at Jackson Memorial included project manager Kevin Reece and pharmacy director Marc Calhoun.
In early 2004, G. William Tomecko Jr., the hospital's Associate Pharmacy Director, noticed billing errors in Cardinal's records. He wrote Calhoun, "This will cause serious consternation at the CFO level. We were supposed to reduce costs by $4 million." Tomecko said Calhoun resisted his enquiries, and "took all the documents from me and requested that I not continue to determine the concerns." Calhoun has since left Cardinal.
Tomecko also found invoices from Reece from a strip club, liquor stores, and fishing boat campgrounds. Reece has since been charged with fraud.
Cook, who had gone fishing with Reece, and approved his bills, resigned and moved out of state.
An outside audit showed that the contract with Cardinal, which was supposed to save $4 million a year, actually cost the hospital $15.5 million. The audit identified $3.1 million in incorrect billing, and $5.9 million in patient under-billing.
A million here, a million there, and after a while these add up to serious costs for the health care system....

Post Title Conflicts of Interest and Jackson Memorial Hospital's Pharmacy Contract